Re: PGP key-signing party (summary)

[Phil Temples <ptemples@hulaw6.law.harvard.edu>]

Hi all,

I cross-posted my original query about PGP key signing parties to the SAGE-Members 
and BBLISA lists.  Follows is a cross-section of the responses.  Thanks to all who 
took the time to respond!

Phil Temples originally asked:

> I've suggested to our local IT users group that we hold a PGP
> key-signing party at our next monthly meeting.  I've never actually been
> a part of a key-signing party, and so I am looking for suggestions on
> how to structure this critter.  I have given it some thought, and
> believe that I know the requirements, but I don't want to overlook
> anything.

> Comments (direct to me) if you have any, and I'll be glad to summarize
> for the list.  Thanks in advance.

Dave Pascoe <dave@mathworks.com> replied:

| This is a good start:
| 
| http://ftp.nl.net/events/sane98/keysigning-party.html
| 

I also heard from John Orthoefer <jco@bbnplanet.com>, who wrote:

> ...Here is how they normally work:

>         o you should tell people what they need to bring.
>            + a photo ID with name printed on it. (Drivers Licence or Passports
> are good)
>              corprate IDs and health club cards are bad
>            + a PGP key fingerprint (some people print up either stickers for
> the back of busness cards or just little slips of paper.)
>            + what server your key is on.
>         o at the BOF/Party you should give a small intro to what PGP is.  And
> how to check IDs because you are signing off that you believe this
> person is who they say they are.
>         o It would be good for you to print up little hand outs which say how
> to sign a key.

Tom Fitzgerald <tfitz@MIT.EDU> passed along what he calls the "Derek Atkins"
key-signing scheme, which Tom says is well-evolved to avoid some subtle threats
and logistical problems:

*   There are many ways to hold a key-signing session. Many viable
*   suggestions have been given. And, just to add more signal to this
*   newsgroup, I will suggest another one which seems to work very well
*   and also solves the N-squared problem of distributing and signing
*   keys. Here is the process:
*   
*    1. You announce the keysinging session, and ask everyone who plans to
*       come to send you (or some single person who *will* be there) their
*       public key. The RSVP also allows for a count of the number of
*       people for step 3.
*       
*    2. You compile the public keys into a single keyring, run "pgp -kvc"
*       on that keyring, and save the output to a file.
*       
*    3. Print out N copies of the "pgp -kvc" file onto hardcopy, and bring
*       this and the keyring on media to the meeting.
*       
*    4. At the meeting, distribute the printouts, and provide a site to
*       retreive the keyring (an ftp site works, or you can make floppy
*       copies, or whatever -- it doesn't matter).
*       
*    5. When you are all in the room, each person stands up, and people
*       vouch for this person (e.g., "Yes, this really is Derek Atkins --
*       I went to school with him for 6 years, and lived with him for 2").
*       
*    6. Each person securely obtains their own fingerprint, and after
*       being vouched for, they then read out their fingerprint out loud
*       so everyone can verify it on the printout they have.
*       
*    7. After everyone finishes this protocol, they can go home, obtain
*       the keyring, run "pgp -kvc" on it themselves, and re-verify the
*       bits, and sign the keys at their own leisure.
*       
*    8. To save load on the keyservers, you can optionally send all
*       signatures to the original person, who can coalate them again into
*       a single keyring and propagate that single keyring to the
*       keyservers and to each individual.

Additionally, Jim Dennis <jimd@starshine.org> was kind enough to include text from
a SVLUG/LinuxWorld "GNU Privacy Guard" key signing event.  It's a little long to 
include in its entirety here, but it is certainly well thought out.  I'll be happy 
to pass it along on Jim's behalf, if requested.  Thanks, Jim!

Finally,  my sincere thanks to Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>, who included excerpts 
of his introductory text that he wrote for the USENIX PGP keysigning service, found
at: http://www.usenix.org/pgp/pgpintro.html .  Greg and I exchanged several e-mails
about some more subtle aspects of trust as it relates to those who conduct the 
actual PGP key-signing party.  

Thanks, everyone!

Phil

--
Phil Temples
UNIX Systems Administrator
Information Technology Services
Harvard Law School
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
Phone:  617 496-6518
Fax:  617 495-1110
E-mail: ptemples@law.harvard.edu
PGP fingerprint: 6614 A7D7 ADC5 BF32  75D6 84BF CF81 E452