Re[2]: [SAGE] The danger of SSH keys..

["Dustin Puryear" <dustin@puryear-it.com>]

A key difference here is that with a system password, I can at least
force the user to set a password rather than leaving it blank. I can
also require a minimum strength. With SSH keys, I can't do *any* of
that.

The points about two-factor authentication are well-taken, but I guess
I'm just trying to focus on SSH keys specifically in this thread. To
me, they are both convenient and very dangerous. More so than just
passwords since you can mitigate some disadvantages of passwords to
some degree, but it's very difficult to enforce anything on SSH keys
since it's really so client-focused.

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Monday, January 22, 2007, 11:26:32 AM, you wrote:

> I think the issue is that in many situations people can generate keys on
> machines over which you don't have any control whatsoever. If I can log in
> to your server from my laptop, you don't have any way to ensure that I've
> put a good passphrase on my private key; whereas if I'm logging in with a
> password, you can do things on the server side to ensure that I've chosen
> a good one.

> Then again, you can't control what I do with my excellent password; I
> might write it down on a post-it stuck to my monitor, or repeat it aloud a
> hundred times in the same room as my pet parrot, or put it in my profile
> on MySpace, or whatever. There's only so much you can do to prevent users
> from screwing up; telling them what to do, and punishing them if you catch
> them not doing it, may be your best bet in many cases. (And if you can't
> justify something more hardcore, like physical token based security, or
> whatever.)

>                                       -Josh (irilyth@infersys.com)